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Introduction
Macroeconomic announcements and their effects on security prices are of crucial importance for the understanding of market behavior, especially in recent years, since the onset of the financial market crisis and the subsequent global economic slump have shown that market participants do base their decisions on major economic news and information. In this study, we focus on the direct short-term effects of announcements made by the European Central Bank (ECB). Using intraday data that consists of each single trade information for the securities used, we investigate whether and how bid-ask spreads are affected by ECB decisions and announcements.
Bid-ask spreads play a substantial role in the evaluation of market functioning and behavior, and have accordingly been well researched in previous market microstructure investigations.
For more than four decades researchers have analyzed the microstructural behavior of markets in an effort to reveal the driving factors behind observable differences in buy and sell prices for immediate trade executions. Most literature on market microstructure with a focus on macroeconomic announcements investigates impacts on foreign exchange markets rather than on stock prices. Bossaerts and Hillion (1991) , Bollerslev and Melvin (1994) and Andersen et al. (2007) for example provide studies in that area. Several authors have focused particularly on the influence of (monetary) news announcements on the microstructure of foreign exchange markets (e.g. Ederington and Lee (1993) , DeGennaro and Shrieves (1997) and Bauwens et al. (2005) ).
Studies investigating the effects on the stock market usually focus on the implications for market volatility or returns arising from macroeconomic news. Jubinski and Tomljanovich (2013) and Savor and Wilson (2013) , for example, examine return effects due to macro impacts, but to the best of our knowledge there is no study directly investigating the consequences of ECB announcements on the bid-ask spread using intraday data. Considering the 4 effects of major announcements as highly important in the context of stock market pricing, we analyze the impact of both interest rate decisions and press conferences by the ECB.
Using a general market model, we derive the theoretical reasoning for alterations of spreads based on macroeconomic announcements. The market model is empirically tested with European stock market data on trade-by-trade frequency. Our findings reveal a temporary but sharp rise in spreads of stocks traded at high frequency around a macroeconomic announcement by the ECB. This is of particular interest to policy-makers, institutions and market participants, as enhanced knowledge of the spread formation helps to improve market and trading efficiency, as well as exchange competitiveness. Since the bid-ask spread can be seen as a measure of certain transaction costs (Demsetz (1986) ) 1 , knowledge concerning structurally higher spreads surrounding ECB announcements even helps investors who are not interested in day trading. Avoiding periods of high transaction costs for portfolio adjustments thus leads to a better medium-or long-term performance.
Market microstructure literature concerning bid-ask spreads is the most important background for our approach and study setup. Existing studies mostly discuss dealer markets that are among the quote-driven types of market structure, as opposed to order-driven markets, and can be broadly classified into three categories.
The first deals with the pure measurement of spreads and includes among others the seminal studies by Roll (1984) and Choi et al. (1988) . These try, essentially, to measure the spread by using the covariance in price changes, which must be negative if there are differences between ask and bid prices The final category of classical microstructure papers also employs order processing components, but additionally deals with the role of information. An information component captures the influence of asymmetric information in the market on the spread. If some investors are better informed than the market maker, they are able to make arbitrage profits by buying stocks that are currently underpriced and selling stocks that are overpriced (relative to their view reflecting the information). In order to offset those losses at least partially, market makers are expected to set a higher spread. Given that information asymmetry in the market rises and all other influences remain constant, the spreads also have to rise accordingly. Studies in this category are provided by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) , Easley and O'Hara (1987), Glosten (1987) and Easley et al. (1996) . There are also some mixed models which incorporate inventory and asymmetric information effects; these include the studies 6 by Glosten and Harris (1988), Hasbrouck (1988) , Madhavan and Smidt (1991) and Lyons (1995) , among others.
While microstructure literature of the category that uses information effects is of particular importance to our study, so are general studies including information effects from announcements. Empirical evidence on this is mixed, depending on which type of announcement is under investigation. Fleming and Remolona (1999) , Frino and Hill (2001) Wilson (2013) identifies a significantly higher stock market return for days with scheduled macroeconomic announcements using daily returns.
As noted above, we use trade-by-trade stock data and estimate the effects from ECB announcements, investigating reactions of the bid-ask spread rather than those of the (middle)
price. The basis for our investigation and theoretical reasoning is presented in the next section: a formal market model which can be used for dealer markets as well as for continuous order-driven markets, or for mixed forms. This enables us to use data on different stocks regardless of the way they have been traded, which is paramount when analyzing market structure-type effects across different countries as trading systems. Section 3 describes the empirical setup and methodology for identifying the spread size and announcement effects, as well as the data used. Section 4 discusses the results and Section 5 provides economic implications and discussions. Concluding remarks follow in Section 6. 
Theoretical model
We discussed several driving factors for the spread of financial assets in the introductory section. Based on this, we provide a very general framework with a market model for the bid and ask formation in this section. It is very broad in the sense that it allows for different types of effects and markets. Specific types of market, such as the monopolistic dealer market, can be derived as special cases from the general model. Our model thus includes the classical factors order processing costs, inventory costs and an asymmetric information component.
We consider it straightforward to use a general design of the model that helps one understand the theoretical considerations behind movements in spreads that have become well used in the relevant fields of research, regardless of which kind of market is under investigation. This will enable us later to discuss our empirical findings along a theoretical framework, rather than referring cryptically to "informational effects".
The ask and bid prices, P a i,t and P b i,t are defined as follows for each market participant i at time t 3 :
In this specification, the bid and ask prices are a function of the equilibrium price P * i,t , an order processing cost component T i , an asymmetric information component A i,t and an inventory cost component I i,t . The order processing or "transaction" costs T i (referring to one round-trip transaction, that is, a consecutive buy and sell) are assumed to be constant over time. Regarding the inventory cost component, a (too) short position in a security is 3 P a i,t , for instance, represents the price at which participant i would sell stocks and not necessarily a price actually observable on the market. For the equilibrium price representing the value of the asset assumed by individual i at time t, we define an autoregressive system. The change in the equilibrium price then evolves according to a random walk:
As in Glosten and Harris (1988) and many studies that followed, the error term ε i,t is i.i.d.
and is due to the arrival of new publicly available information. It describes the update of the belief concerning the real value of the asset due to new information. From all the definitions above we can finally derive the general market participant's spread as:
The inventory component drops out because it influences only the location and not the size of the spread 4 . The asymmetric information component is modeled as follows:
Specific dates are important and incorporated by D i,t , since regular scheduled macroeconomic announcements, for example, can have an impact on spreads. The error term v i,t is another i.i.d. zero-mean process. It incorporates any news which has an influence on the belief about asymmetric information. In empirical investigations asymmetric information is modeled using various explanatory variables such as transaction volume (since high volumes might be seen as indicators of informed trading) or return volatility (increasing uncertainty).
We will discuss this further in the empirical section.
At this point it is worth pointing out that the individual spread S i,t describes the spread of any one market participant. In the case of a (monopolistic) dealer market, the above equation for the spread gives the actual spread of the dealer and so of the market, but in the case of a competitive dealer market, a limit order market, or mixed forms of these, one has rather to focus on the inside spread. This is because best bid and best ask prices do not have to be posed by the same market participant:
This defines the inside spread, where i is the individual who poses the best ask and j is the individual who poses the best bid. This would be a simple but broad representation of the relevant spread in a competitive market, which applies to most stock markets nowadays.
One can define the components of the spreads in even more detail, for example, by describing the asymmetric information component by including risk aversion, as it is done by Ho and Stoll (1981) . This is not, however, necessary for the purposes of this study. We provide further insight into the workings of the general model and the classical market examples in the Appendix.
The theoretical considerations in this section form the basis for the following empirical investigation. If, for example, one observes higher spreads after an announcement while the number of participants does not shrink, one can take this as an empirical indication of higher asymmetric information after the announcement (Frino and Hill (2001) ). It can be due either to market participants being better informed because of superior information or to a higher degree of uncertainty about the fundamental value of the asset. If a market participant faces a higher uncertainty about the fundamental value he will increase his spread because the chance of a loss due to a mistake in his own beliefs concerning the prices will rise. If, however, one observes tighter spreads after an announcement, one can expect the announce-ment to have removed uncertainty. In this case, the reduced information asymmetry should lessen the incentive of market makers to compensate with higher spreads. Notably, these effects usually relate to the span that bid and ask builds around the equilibrium price, which itself might change drastically or not at all. Bomfim (2003) and Jubinski and Tomljanovich (2013) , for example, put their focus on these changes in the price itself, while our study, as mentioned above, provides an analysis of the impact that news has on the differences between buy and sell prices. While our theoretical model was used to formalize the effects of different spread factors that have become more or less standard in the related literature, and to understand the workings of the different components, the empirical investigation in the next section has the aim of showing whether there are any such effects on spreads and where they may originate.
Empirical setup

Derivation of the empirical estimation equation
To derive the empirical estimation equation, we take the inside spread from our theoretical considerations in the previous section. We average the spread over one-minute periods.
Here the individuals i and j can change from transaction to transaction, depending on who poses the most competitive prices over time. It is important to note the beneficial effect of aggregating data to the minute frequency: trades may occur in heavily differing frequency when, for example, several trades are executed during one second and no shares are traded for several seconds during other phases. Adjusting to a one-minute frequency solves this problem by providing equidistant observations. Even though one loses some information, using trade-by-trade data first as a basis still retains its favorability over lowerfrequency raw data -as the averaging of single-trade spreads is different from calculations using the last prices of one-minute or five-minute intervals. Furthermore, the averaging deals with some issues concerning the inventory component: on the individual level the inventory position should have an influence only on the spread location and not on the spread size, as already mentioned in our theoretical section. However, if the inside spread is considered, the inventory effects can lead to a change in spread size for example, if one participant poses the best ask price after buying stocks and the best bid posed by another market participant has not changed.
But the same reasoning can also lead to a widening of the spread, and here is no reason for a structural change of the size of the inside spread due to inventory effects. So spread size changes due to this should have a mean of zero and the average spread over the one-minute interval should be free from inventory effects 5 .
The average inside spread becomes:
There is no reason why the weighting parameter c should be different on the bid and the ask side. The average inventory component for best ask (bid) will be positive (negative), since market participants with a positive (negative) inventory offer more competitive ask (bid) prices, following the theoretical considerations given in Section 2 and the Appendix 6 .
However, as stated in the previous paragraph, the average inventory terms will not change over time and there is no reason why the mean of the inventory components should be different in absolute terms | E(Ī i,t ) |=| E(Ī j,t ) |, so both terms can be treated as constant.
The equilibrium price assumed by market participants will be structurally lower on the ask side and higher on the bid side 7 . It is possible that the average belief changes over time, especially surrounding announcements. But there is no reason why the difference between the average ask-side equilibrium price and the bid-side equilibrium price should change over time, so it is expected to be constant. Average order processing costs on the bid and ask sides should not be different (T i =T j ), and can also be assumed to be constant 8 .
The average asymmetric information component should normally be the same for the bid and ask sides. From the above reasoning, taking the expectation yields the following expression:
The equation has collapsed to a constant part, given in the first bracket, and the asymmetric information part, given in the last bracket. Here, we have already taken the expectation E for the spread equation. Inserting the average asymmetric information component and including the trade volumeV t and the numbers of trade per minuteN t yields:
As briefly discussed earlier, the trade volume (measured in ten thousand stocks)V t and the number of trades per minuteN t serve as additional variables which can contain information about informed trading. Easley et al. (1996) state that there is a higher probability of informed trading in stocks with low trading volumes, so we include the number of trades per minute to account for these effects. On the other hand, large block trades seem to be related to adjustments due to new information, so we include the number of shares traded per minute in our setup 9 . Following this, we assume that numbers of trades and trade volume have a negative and positive impact, respectively, on the spread size. In addition, including these variables accounts for any potential information loss due to the aggregation to minute-frequency. In a stochastic estimation form, using K for all constant terms, this becomes:
Using the spread series of different stocks, one can perform a pooled OLS regression to obtain information about the driving factors behind the spread. Compared with stockindividual regressions, which are used in many event-type studies, the pooled regression has the advantage that we have enough degrees of freedom to include a dummy variable for every minute under investigation. So we can see if there are any spread changes that are not explained by the other variables for the whole investigation period rather than for only the time surrounding the announcement. One disadvantage of the pooled OLS is the assumption of cross-sectionally common reaction coefficients for all stocks. To minimize the effect of this,
we include a specific dummy variable for each stock to account for a stock-specific constant in the spread, denoted by Z. Additionally, we use only common stocks in one pooled regression in the sense that they are from the same country, frequently traded and all blue chips. This leads to considerably homogeneous sets of regression entries. Finally, the trade volume and numbersof trades included are not merely part of the asymmetric information term but also have the advantage that they account for stock-specific relevance. The estimation function containing all the explained variables is written in the usual matrix notation below:
In addition to the stock-specific dummy-variables, matrix Z also contains some dummy variables to control for extreme outliers. However, at most we had to control for twelve outliers in one of the FTSE estimations, a considerably small number in estimations with over eight thousand observations.
It is obvious that the empirical setup at this point fully reflects the theoretical background explained in Section 2, augmented with variables that control for stock-specific effects. To account for potentially influential effects that should be controlled for in the estimation, we define additional specifications. All estimations were conducted using White standard errors, which are robust against heteroscedasticity.
As robustness checks we also estimated a modification using GARCH(1,1) conditional volatility estimates as a variable measuring volatility. In addition, we estimated all setups including an AR(1) term to account for possible autocorrelation. The potential weakness of using a lagged dependent variable in a pooled OLS framework calls for a cautious interpretation of the results obtained from the same, which merely serve as an indicator exercise on possible neglected effects. Lyons et al. (1995) state that larger spreads due to new information in the market stay higher for a specific time horizon. This is expected to be caused by different market participants' beliefs concerning the impact on prices. So it is reasonable to assume that asymmetric information stays in the market for some time and gives us a reason to check for autocorrelated structures. Finally, we re-estimated our setups using Newey-West standard errors to account for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.
Data and Announcements
Data used for the empirical investigation was drawn from Bloomberg. It contains informa- We used several other dates for counterfactual exercises to check whether results are due to normal daytime properties of the spreads rather than announcement effects. These are dates that are chosen to be (i) days before and after announcement days, or (ii) matching weekdays in the week before and after. For the sake of brevity, all except one example are reported in the Appendix.
The spread used in this study was calculated by subtracting the latest best bid price from the transaction price if the transaction price was equal to or higher than the latest best ask price (transaction at the ask), or by subtracting the transaction price from the latest best ask price if the transaction price was equal to or lower than the latest best bid price
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(transaction at the bid). Afterwards, the spread was divided by the mid-price between the transaction price and the latest best bid (ask) to make the results comparable for different stocks.
Finally the transaction-based data was aggregated to minute-frequency, as explained in the methodology sections. Minutes with no trade have been excluded. The resulting series are called the relative realized spread (S r t ) and give the costs for a potential round trip relative to the share midprice during the respective minute. The usual time for the ECB interest rate decision disclosure is 13:45 and the press conference usually starts at 14:30 10 . ECB announcements are always on Thursdays in our sample. If there is an influence of macroeconomic announcements by the ECB on prices and spreads, one should observe changes in the data around this time (Ederington and Lee (1993)). Table 1 gives an overview of the different dates used in the empirical investigation. Data of the stocks from the German DAX 30, the French CAC 40 and the British FTSE 100 Index have been used, the latter serving for comparative analysis as the stocks from the United Kingdom should be less sensitive than Euro-area stocks. Additionally, the days under consideration have all been checked for other important macroeconomic announcements using the Financial Times Economic Calendar.
The most important control announcement for this study seems to be the US initial jobless claim numbers from the US Department of Labor, because these are usually released every Thursday at 8:30 EST (14:30 CET) i.e. the usual time of the ECB press conference.
Results
In the following we provide our empirical results. At the beginning of every subsection, the respective figures show the relative realized spreads over time, measured as the average of the individual spreads of the stocks of each included country. The first figure always shows the spreads on days with important announcements i.e. the two interest rate cuts in our sample and the OMT announcement. It also shows the spread on the example comparison date August 30th, 2012. This date was the same weekday as of the crucial announcement on September 6th of the following week. For that day, data of the same daytime was used to check whether the findings were simply due to time properties of stock markets, as is re- The tables then show the estimation results. Spreads were used in percent, the volume was measured in 10,000 shares, and the change in price was used in normal numbers.
DAX
In Figure 1 , showing the relative realized spreads for the DAX stocks on important dates, one can observe strong increases in spread during the times of the ECB interest rate announcements and the corresponding press conferences. The data for August 30th, 2012 does not show this strong pattern, which can be seen as first evidence of an announcement effect. while effects are seen for both points of the daytime, the ECB interest rate announcements are supposed to be the driver. Notably, even if the US announcements were as influential as the domestic ones, this would not take away from the analysis on theoretical grounds regarding the pricing and information effects, as will be discussed later. Table 2 Traden. The table shows the estimation results (coefficients and t-statistics) for certain dates for the DAX stocks. The specifications correspond to the respective model setups explained in the text. *,** and *** indicate significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The lower 10 variables correspond to the dummy variables for the respective one minute interval following the stated daytime.
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Figure 2: Relative Realized Spreads DAX 2
The figure shows the relative realized spread during the daytime and days under consideration averaged over all DAX stocks.
percentage points on July 5th, 2012, for example. The trade volume seems to play no role, since none of the coefficients here is statistically significant.
A huge effect of the announcements is observed which cannot be captured either by the volume, the number of trades, the volatility, or the price change. This is evident from the highly significant dummy variables for the relevant minutes. The sharp rise in spread begins shortly before the interest announcement or at the time of the announcement, depending on which specification is under consideration, and the announcement effect net of the other explanatory variables amounts to over 65% of the basis spread on July 5th, 2012. We can observe the same pattern for the time shortly before the press conference on that day, and here the spread rises even more: the announcement effect amounts to over 80% of the basis 
CAC
Following the results for Germany, those for French stocks of the CAC 40 are reported.
Unfortunately, no data was available for July 5th, 2012, leading to the omission of that one day as compared to the German sample, using DAX stocks. Again, increases in the realized spread can be observed, with the effects around the announcement times on the important days being much stronger than on other days. Table 3 shows the relevant estimation results for the CAC stocks.
Estimated constant terms are quite similar to the DAX constants and the basis spread amounts to between 0.035% and 0.065% of the relevant stock price. In contrast to the results for DAX stocks, the trade number plays no significant role in the formation of the spreads.
Trade volume is again insignificant in most specifications except for estimations for May 2nd, 2013. Here, the estimations reveal a negative impact of trade volume on spreads, at least on the 5% significance level, which is in contrast to theoretical considerations. However, the impact is quite low, since trade volume is measured in 10,000 trades. Following the results, a trade of 10,000 shares leads to a decrease in spreads of about 0.0006 percentage points. Furthermore, omitting the stock-specific dummy variables again alters the results, as in the case of the DAX estimations: the number of trades becomes statistically highly significant and negative, while the trade volume coefficient stays either insignificant or is 24 The table shows the estimation results for certain dates for the CAC stocks. The specifications correspond to the respective model setups explained in the text. *,** and *** indicate significance on the 10%, 5% and 1% level. The lower 10 variables correspond to the dummy variables for the respective one minute interval following the stated daytime.
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Figure 4: Relative Realized Spreads CAC 2
The figure shows the relative realized spread during the daytime and days under consideration averaged over all CAC stocks. positively significant. Price volatility is highly significant and shows the expected sign in all specifications, regardless of whether it is measured as APPC or QPPC.
As in the DAX case, the time dummy variables are highly significant and, compared with the basis spread, quite large at times of important decisions, which was already apparent in the figures. For example, the time around the press conference on September 6th, 2012
is characterized by spreads that are up to 150% higher than the basis spread. Again, the estimations for August 30th, 2012 show some increase in spreads during the time under consideration but these are much smaller and do not stay high as long as on days with important announcements. All formerly mentioned robustness checks were conducted and support the findings given here. The findings of the counterfactual estimations correspond to the DAX results.
FTSE
Having found evidence of positive impacts of the ECB announcements on spreads in two major Eurozone countries, we turn to the FTSE 100 index for United Kingdom stocks.
Since Great Britain is not a member of the Eurozone, one would expect that the impact of the ECB decisions would not be as strong for stocks of this index as for Eurozone stocks.
However, ECB decisions and announcements should still have indirect impacts on companies from other currency areas, especially within Europe, albeit on a smaller scale.
Data was not available for all dates, but the remaining dates for which the realized spread is The coefficients describing the volatility of the stock price are in every specification highly 27 we can observe a strong increase in spreads of about 64% (up to 100%) of the basis spread.
Comparing the spread increase around the press conference during these days with those of the comparison date shows that it is much larger, implying that the ECB announcement is of higher impact for UK stocks than the US announcement. From the authors' point of view, this is in line both with what to expect and with the results for Eurozone stocks above.
Again, all robustness checks using heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent standard errors further strengthen our view of the reliability of the estimations and the results.
The findings of the conducted counter factual estimations correspond to the DAX and CAC results.
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Discussion
The empirical findings clearly show that ECB announcements have an influence on European stock spreads. Spreads tend to rise shortly before announcements and return to their initial level shortly afterwards. Increases are stronger in Eurozone stocks than in nonEurozone stocks, as checked by using FTSE stocks in the analysis. This is perfectly in line with theoretical considerations, since one can assume that the importance of ECB decisions is higher for Eurozone stocks, but is still relevant to other European stock markets -especially when close trading partners such as the UK are considered.
The theoretical framework that serves as a baseline for the study, makes clear that the observable rises in spread must come from the asymmetric information component. As spreads rise strongly in line with announcements that are important for price changes in stocks, market-makers and brokers apparently widen the spreads to compensate for potential losses incurred from the exploitation of information by traders. Even when controlling for other variables which may drive spreads, the increase in spreads is huge and so the spread is occasionally twice as high as half an hour earlier when changes in interest rates are announced.
This also holds true for the influential Draghi speech on OMT. On days with ECB announcements where no interest rate changes were made, the spread increased much less; and for FTSE stocks it seems that there were no effects at all on those days.
Interestingly, surveys regularly carried out by Bloomberg before interest rate announcements reveal that the ECB decisions to keep the interest rates unchanged on those days were expected by most market observers 11 . Accordingly, there was probably less uncertainty about the fundamental value of the stocks in the market. The interest rate cut on July 5th, 2012
was also expected by many market observers (Black and Randow (2012)), but this was the first time that the main refinancing rate was lowered below 1%. Additionally, a change in a crucial variable like the interest rate can also cause uncertainty about the fundamental value, even though it was expected. The decision on September 6th, 2012 not to change the rate, on the other hand, was not commonly anticipated before (Thesing (2012) Certain US macro announcements also have huge impacts on the spreads of European stocks. This is apparently due to the importance of US economic indicators (such as the initial jobless claims), to the world economy and, by that, also to European stock markets. One can see these effects by looking at our results and the discussion in the previous section, but also by looking at the counterfactual results (result tables are supplied in the Appendix). Here we can observe huge spread increases, for example, on April 5th, 2013 surrounding 14:30CET, which is due to three major macroeconomic US data releases (unemployment numbers, trade balance, private payrolls). It has already been reported by Harju and Hussain (2011) that US macro announcements have a significant impact on prices and the volatility of European equity markets, and from our study it is evident that they also lead to spread increases.
Turning to the additional variables, we were able to observe a strong and significantly positive impact of volatility on spreads. As volatility is a measure of market uncertainty, these results further strengthen our theoretical considerations about the information component.
The results concerning trading volume and numbers of trades are ambiguous at first glance because the coefficients are often insignificant or characterized by changing signs. However, if we omit the stock-specific dummy variables from our analysis the resulting coefficients 31 are as assumed, based on the theoretical framework. This leads to the interpretation that these variables can be used rather as stock-specific variables, measuring the longer-term characteristics of the stocks, than as reliable influence variables in high-frequency spread adjustments.
Concluding remarks
In this study we have analyzed the impact of ECB macro announcements on European blue chips. We find that there is a strong and highly significant impact of macro announcements on spread size, which is due to changes in asymmetric information in the market. In line with this, spread reactions are especially high around very important announcements, such as the Outright Monetary Transactions announcement, and around unexpected news.
In addition, we have found that the reactions tend to be higher for Eurozone spreads than for British spreads, which is probably due to the varying importance of ECB announcements in these areas. Furthermore, major US macroeconomic announcements seem to have a strong impact on the spreads of European stocks.
Unfortunately, no data was available to test the impact of an ECB announcement concerning an increase in interest rates. Further research in this area is highly recommended to give more robustness to the findings and to investigate an interest rate increase announcement.
It would also be interesting to check the reactions of the spreads of European stocks to announcements of other central banks and to further analyze the reactions to US news.
Appendix Model explanation and further discussion
If one is not considering a monopolistic dealer market, it is more appropriate to investigate the inside spread rather than the individual spread. The inside spread is the difference between the most competitive prices (the lowest ask price and the highest bid price) (Glosten (1987) ). The reason for using the inside spread is that in most cases, for example in a limit order book market, the most competitive prices will usually not be set by the same market participants. So the inside spread is: In a monopolistic dealer market, the spread would be the difference between the two prices shown by the red bars (P In a non-monopolistic market, one can draw a different picture. Figure 7 shows a stylized example of a non-monopolistic market in the sense that other participants are also acting as liquidity suppliers.
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Figure A2: Example 2 P states the respective price. a denotes that it is an ask price, b that it is a bid price and * indicates the equilibrium price. t indicates the status as described in the text and the first sub index indicates the market participant. S * 1 indicates the inside spread.
There will be no bid price higher than the lowest ask price and vice versa because any desire to trade at this condition would be directly executed. Here, the inside spread is
It is obvious that the probability of a smaller spread will increase with the number of market participants, so there can be a small spread even when the beliefs about the true value diverge and the asymmetric information in the market is high. But assuming all other variables are constant (especially the number of participants), an increase in asymmetric information in the market will lead to higher spreads. Figure 8 shows the same situation as in Figure 2 , but with a higher asymmetric information belief for all participants. 
